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Abstract 
In modern times, Aristotelian influence on Islamicate philosophical writing is exaggerated. Al-Fārābī 
did more than just copy Aristotle, he was an original thinker, and he may have sourced aspects of 
his thought and writing style from the Qurʾān. Consideration of al-Fārābī’s biography, works and 
historical context demonstrates his disinclination to base his writings on those of Aristotle. Al-
Fārābī’s thoughts in the key area of revelation in al-Madīna al-fāḍila demonstrate his departure 
from ancient Greek belief in this area, although his use of individual reasoning also shows clearly 
his occasional disagreement with Islamic doctrine. Differences and commonalities between animals 
and humans as written by al-Fārābī can be compared with Aristotle’s dissimilar thoughts on these 
matters, refuting the idea that al-Fārābī was simply an Aristotelian philosopher. Use of the religious 
term fiṭra in al-Madīna al-fāḍila is a microcosm of its writer’s propensity to include the terminology 
of revealed religion in this book. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transliterations of Arabic follow the International Journal of Middle East Studies system with the 
sole exception that the definite article preceding sun letters is transliterated how it is pronounced; 
Greek transliterations follow the Pennsylvania State University system. 
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Chapter One: Introduction and Background 
Introduction 
How humans are related to animals is an important question which some notable philosophers 
have attempted to tackle, whether generally or in a specifically political context. Perhaps more 
important still is the question of how God interacts with and commands humans. Abū Naṣr al-
Fārābī (c.260-c.340AH)1 wrote about these themes in his Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila 
(variously translated as On the Perfect State, Principles of the Views of the People of the Perfect 
State, etc., henceforth al-Madīna al-Fāḍila). Much has been made in books about Islamicate 
philosophy written in European languages of the dominating influence of ancient knowledge – 
usually Greek but also Persian, Pharaonic and other sources – on the scholarly culture of mediaeval 
Islamicate societies. 
This study, which focusses specifically on elements of one work of al-Fārābī in particular, does not 
aim to reject this idea entirely, rather simply to stress in addition to it the importance of other 
influences, notably in this case the Noble Qurʾān as well as al-Fārābī’s original thinking, although 
the latter may have been unintentional.2 Analysis of key sections of al-Madīna al-fāḍila is the 
central key to achieving this. Such an analysis gives us the basis to evaluate the ideas, methodology 
and style of al-Fārābī, backing up any tentative conclusions with specific evidence from primary 
sources.  
We can use a detailed knowledge of al-Madīna al-fāḍila to demonstrate or suggest that al-Fārābī 
did not simply copy Aristotle – he had his own unique ideas about animals, humans and God and 
their natures or Nature, and moreover he used many of the ideas inherent in his Muslim faith. 
                                                          
1
 All dates except the publications of modern books are AH unless otherwise specified. 
2
 For the question of al-Fārābī’s thought being unintentional, see the discussion of the transmission of the 
texts of Aristotle’s works on animals, below pp20-22. 
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Replacing or downplaying the influence of Aristotle in some areas of al-Fārābī’s oeuvre has the 
potential to alter how we understand al-Fārābī, and perhaps how we understand Islamicate 
philosophy as a whole. 
The scope of this thesis is broad, but manageable. A highly detailed commentary on the whole of 
al-Madīna al-fāḍila would be impossible given the space available, as well as undesirable firstly 
because al-Fārābī describes such a wide variety of subjects which are often only tenuously related 
to one another and secondly because of the sheer length of al-Madīna al-Fāḍila. This ideologically 
dense book of about 145 pages is the mature work3 of al-Fārābī – he details in it his views on many 
aspects of philosophy, making it impossible for us to analyse in detail every section of this book, not 
to mention that some often-discussed topics such as the specific characteristics of flawed states are 
not particularly relevant to this study. It will be argued that, broadly speaking, al-Fārābī has been 
misunderstood – Aristotle’s influence on him is not as important as is often claimed in secondary 
sources, and the significance of religion has largely been ignored in these sources. Updating and 
emending the notion of the centrality of Peripatetic ideas, adding the importance of al-Fārābī’s 
originality and the influence of his faith, would allow us to understand al-Fārābī’s work quite 
differently.4 
The main reason for selecting animal-human relationships and revelation as areas of focus is that 
even though these topics are sometimes referred to in passing as being areas of commonality 
between Aristotle and al-Fārābī,5 no critical study has yet examined them in detail. Commentaries 
on al-Fārābī’s works can be prone to taking the Aristotelian paradigm for granted, but here we have 
                                                          
3
 See “Al-Fārābī’s Biography, Oeuvre and Scholarly Milieu” below. 
4
 Especially the recondite Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma which discusses gnosis. Understanding this and other works from 
the point of view of specifically Islamic philosophy, as opposed to Islamicate philosophy dominated by 
Aristotle’s influence, could shed new light on the meanings of al-Fārābī’s ideas. Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma could be 
recategorised as a sort of Sufi or mystical text. 
5
 Walzer (see below, pp6-7) cites Aristotle’s works on animals, notably On the Generation of Animals, 
extensively in his commentary on al-Madīna al-fāḍila, for example. He claims (1998 pp398ff.) that al-Fārābī 
bases chapter 12 of al-Madīna al-fāḍila on Aristotle’s On the Generation of Animals, presupposing that an 
accurate, comprehensive edition of Aristotle’s psychological and biological writings was used by al-Fārābī. 
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the opportunity to examine critically to what extent al-Fārābī was influenced by Aristotle’s works 
on animals in an attempt to demonstrate the excessive emphasis placed by modern scholars on his 
influences from Peripatetic ideas. 
In light of the fact that so much contemporary literature on Islamicate philosophy takes the 
Aristotelian pattern for granted, the focus of this thesis is the primary sources, foremost among 
them al-Madīna al-fāḍila. This study aims to identify what the text itself says, challenging this 
common idea that Aristotle was the main influence on al-Fārābī and opening up hitherto neglected 
aspects of his philosophy. Al-Fārābī lived in a polyglot, multicultural and religiously diverse society. 
While he discussed a considerable variety of issues even in al-Madīna al-fāḍila itself, some of the 
most important of these are related to the practical application of rationalism within revealed 
religion and, by extension, how society ought to interpret and use the rules and guidelines of 
revealed religion. Updating and emending existing ideas about al-Madīna al-fāḍila and al-Fārābī’s 
oeuvre more generally can shed light on ancient solutions to problems which continue to be 
relevant in the modern world. 
Sources and Methodology 
The text of al-Madīna al-fāḍila which has been used is Richard Walzer’s critical edition, On the 
Perfect State, originally published in 1985 and reprinted in 1998.6 This edition of the text has been 
written using a complete corpus of ten manuscripts which date from 468AH to the thirteenth 
century of the Hijra.7 Walzer has preserved the chapter and paragraph divisions which are present 
in the earliest extant manuscripts, and I have followed this same system in referencing his edition. 
With regard to diacritics, these generally follow the text as found in Walzer’s edition except in some 
                                                          
6
 Walzer, R. (ed.), 1998, On the Perfect State (KAZI Publications, Chicago) – first published by Oxford 
University Press in 1985. 
7
 See Walzer 1998 pp19ff “The evidence for the text” for a detailed description of the editor’s apparatus 
criticus. 
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quotations where diacritics have been inserted into words whose significations could be 
ambiguous. 
An extensive body of secondary literature on al-Fārābī and his works exists in both Arabic and 
European languages. Some of these books are useful for this current study, and some are not – 
most of them are not specific to the interrelation of animals and humans or revelation in al-Fārābī’s 
philosophy, rather the Active Intellect is often the main focus. Walzer often cites Aristotle’s On the 
Generation of Animals in his commentary on al-Madīna al-fāḍila, but he seldom goes into detail 
about how al-Fārābī used it as a source. The best general overview of Farabism is Ian Richard 
Netton’s Al-Fārābī and his School, which we will have cause to cite to support some general points. 
Richard Walzer, the German-born British expert on ancient and mediaeval philosophy, was perhaps 
the most notable exponent of the pride of place supposedly given to ancient philosophy by al-
Fārābī. Walzer’s outstanding work on al-Fārābī in various areas being well-known8 and without 
trying to criticise his approach, we should attempt to update his views and broaden our 
understanding of al-Fārābī’s work by placing greater emphasis on the variety of different origins of 
the ideas in al-Madīna al-fāḍila - notably Islamic thought and belief, which Walzer does not 
consider in detail in his works on al-Fārābī. 
Ulrich Rudolph’s chapter “Reflections on al-Fārābī’s Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila”9 is one of 
the most important secondary sources which inspired this thesis. Rudolph adopts a similar 
methodology to that used here, namely focussing specifically on the text of al-Madīna al-fāḍila 
itself, but he concludes that Islamic beliefs and principles are so centrally important in this book 
that it ought to be viewed as a sort of Islamic theological work.  
                                                          
8
 See bibliography. His 1998 critical edition of al-Madīna al-fāḍila is especially notable, but one should also 
cite Greek into Arabic: Essays on Islamic Philosophy, a collection of essays published in 1962 on many 
different themes and authors within Islamic philosophy. 
9
 Published in Adamson, P. (ed.), 2008, In the Age of al-Fārābī: Arabic Philosophy in the Fourth/Tenth Century 
(The Warburg Institute). 
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Christopher Colmo aimed in his book Breaking with Athens: Alfarabi as Founder to demonstrate the 
originality of al-Fārābī, while at the same time remembering that al-Fārābī acknowledged that he 
benefited from reading the political philosophy of Plato. The premise of this source, that the 
subject was an original thinker, is supported by good evidence from his books. Joep Lameer’s Al-
Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogistics, published in 1994, is also a useful source for apprehending 
recent developments in scholarly understanding of the various technical terms used by al-Fārābī 
and the relationship between religion, logic and philosophy in al-Madīna al-fāḍila particularly. 
Sources dealing specifically with human-animal relationships in al-Fārābī are somewhat harder to 
find. Georgios Steiris’ pioneering chapter “Isidore of Seville and al-Fārābi on Animals: Ontology and 
Ethics” (published in Animal Ethics: Past and Present Perspectives) approached the question of al-
Fārābī’s attitude towards the nature of animals and how it differs from that of humans by 
comparing it with that of St Isidore of Seville and looking for precedents in ancient Hellenistic 
philosophy. This informative chapter by Steiris demonstrates a firm command of source material, 
but here we have the luxury of relatively plentiful space in which to conduct detailed analyses of 
key sections from the primary text of al-Fārābī. 
Even though a general awareness of the state of scholarship on al-Fārābī until now is informative 
for this thesis, and even though too a specific knowledge of certain notably relevant articles is 
required, we should still look at secondary sources critically. Sometimes the methodology and 
conclusions of its authors can leave something to be desired – analysis of key sections of al-Madīna 
al-fāḍila has to be our main focus. It would be a mistake for various reasons to attempt to attack 
modern scholars who assert the dominance of Aristotelian ideas in al-Fārābī’s thought. Instead we 
can update what writers such as Walzer have suggested, playing down to some extent Aristotle’s 
importance and stressing the equal role of original thought, however unintentional it might have 
been, and ideas based on the religion of Islam. 
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When we are confronted with such a knotty problem as the various influences of al-Fārābī, the first 
thing to be done is to return to the primary texts, mainly al-Madīna al-fāḍila, and try to glean what 
we can from an analysis of these. Only then can we turn to secondary literature. Where 
biographical details about al-Fārābī are relevant, generally these have been taken from mediaeval 
biographical dictionaries, as noted below,10 as well as the Encyclopaedia of Islam.11 
Limited use of Aristotle’s books is important for demonstrating al-Fārābī’s inclination to disagree 
 
with him at times. On the Soul,12 Nicomachean Ethics13 and Metaphysics are the most important of 
Aristotle’s books for us, and they were main sources for his writings in the mediaeval Islamicate 
world. Passages from Aristotle are cited according to the systems used in the printed editions of 
these books and the original text is given in footnotes. 
Al-Fārābī’s Biography, Oeuvre and Scholarly Milieu 
Biography of al-Fārābī 
Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Fārābī14 (c.260-340) was a Muslim philosopher of central 
Asian origin who spent most of his life in Baghdad and the Levant. He may have travelled to Egypt 
in 338.15 Nothing is known for certain about the biography of al-Fārābī beyond the basics – he did 
not write an autobiography per se, and none of his students wrote his biography either – but we 
can suggest that Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila is probably the latest of his extant works on 
philosophy.16  
                                                          
10
 p11n25. See also Bibliography. 
11
 EI “al Fārābī”; “Falsafa”. 
12
 Peri Psychēs in Greek, or De Anima in Latin. 
13
 Or Ethica Nicomachea in Latin. 
14
 The names of al-Fārābī’s grandfather and great-grandfather are not found in the earliest sources. Ibn Abī 
Uṣaybiʿa calls him Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Awzalagh ibn Ṭarkhān al-Fārābī. Another 
possibility is Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ṭarkhān ibn Awzalagh al-Fārābī at-Turkī, as he is 
called by Ibn Khallikān, however this final nisba is not attested elsewhere. 
15
 Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa p603 
16
 Ibid. p605; Walzer 1998 p20. 
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Al-Fārābī wrote extensively on many topics within philosophy, and was also highly knowledgeable 
about mathematics, musical theory and medicine. He knew at least some Greek, which would have 
allowed him access to the original texts of Aristotle where they were available,17 however given the 
paucity of sources for al-Fārābī’s life, we have no information about his efforts at translation, if 
any.18 
Al-Fārābī studied logic with Yūḥannā ibn Ḥaylān. This was probably in Baghdad, where Yūḥannā 
died during the Caliphate of al-Muqtadir.19 Al-Fārābī continued his work in philosophy with Yaḥyā 
ibn ʿAdiyy. The former was in Baghdad until the end of 330. He started to write al-Madīna al-fāḍila 
while still there, and took the work in progress with him to Damascus, where he finished it in 331. 
He may have added six sections summarising al-Madīna al-fāḍila during his possible visit to Egypt in 
338. Biographers mostly agree that he died in Damascus around 340.20 
Although the question of al-Fārābī’s ethnic origin has been debated extensively,21 it is not relevant 
for our purposes here. Whether he was ethnically Persian or Turkish does not change what he 
wrote or how we ought to interpret it. Indeed, we can suggest that, owing to the lack of reliable 
information about his life, debating this point is ultimately a fruitless exercise.22 Most details about 
al-Fārābī’s life and death found in one source are directly contradicted by at least one other. Ṣāʿid 
al-Andalusī (d. 462) was the first biographer to dedicate a whole entry to al-Fārābī,23 summarising 
some of his books and adding the information that he was associated with the Hamdanid ruler Sayf 
ad-Dawla. 
                                                          
17
 Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa p604 
18
 None of the mediaeval biographers give us any information about al-Fārābī’s translations of ancient Greek 
texts, and modern scholars such as Walzer assume that he read such books as translations produced by 
others. 
19
 Al- Masʿūdī p122 
20
 Al-Masʿūdī, writing less than ten years after the fact, states that he died in Rajab 339. Other biographers 
give a date of either 339 or 340 in Damascus, but ash-Shahrazūrī states that he was mugged and killed on the 
road to Ascalon without giving a date (Nuzhat al-arwāḥ p301). 
21
 Walzer 1998 p2; Encyclopædia Iranica “FĀRĀBĪ i. Biography”; etc. 
22
 Encyclopædia Iranica “FĀRĀBĪ i. Biography”. 
23
 Ṭabaqāt al-umam pp53-54 
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The main reason for stressing Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa’s account of al-Fārābī’s life and works is that he 
quotes a rare autobiographical passage in which al-Fārābī gives a tendentious account of the 
history of philosophy and specifically logic from ancient times until his age.24 While we can certainly 
call into question some aspects of the historical narrative presented by al-Fārābī, there is no 
specific reason to doubt the autobiographical information which the biographer quotes. Moreover, 
the inclusion of this passage in ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ does seem to demonstrate that 
Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa had access to primary sources about the life of al-Fārābī, even though some other 
aspects of his account are more myth than historical fact. 
Understanding how biographers, especially Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī, al-Masʿūdī, ash-
Shahrazūrī and Ibn Khallikān,25 wrote about the life of al-Fārābī provides an essential context for 
understanding, in turn, his work itself. Of equal importance for this thesis, however, it also 
demonstrates clearly what his main areas of interest were. It is stated repeatedly and 
unambiguously in all of these biographies that al-Fārābī was a practising Muslim26 – there is no 
sense that he apostatised or denied that the Qurʾān is a genuine, authoritative religious text. This 
supports what we can discover by means of a thorough, careful reading of relevant passages 
written by al-Fārābī himself. 
Al-Fārābī’s works 
The Farabian corpus is vast in scope, making it impossible to cover all of al-Fārābī’s work here, 
however we can briefly describe some of the other important works of al-Fārābī, looking at how al-
Madīna al-fāḍila fits into his oeuvre. About 150 works of varying length are attributed to al-Fārābī, 
not all of which are extant.27  
                                                          
24
 p604 
25
 In their books ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ, Ṭabaqāt al-umam, at-Tanbīh wa’l-ashrāf, Nuzhat al-
arwāḥ wa-rawḍat al-afrāḥ fī tārīkh al-ḥukamāʾ and Wafayāt al-aʿyān wa-ʾanbāʾ abnāʾ az-zamān respectively. 
26
 Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī actually introduces al-Fārābī as faylsūf al-muslimīn “the philosopher of the Muslims” p53. 
27
 Encyclopædia Iranica “FĀRĀBĪ v. Music”. 
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No critical study of the surviving manuscripts of these works generally has yet been undertaken – 
this significant task for the future would have to name repeated listings under different titles and 
possible misattributions, as well as any double listings of the same books in Arabic and Persian.28 
Although Steinscheider was the first to make a critical appraisal of al-Fārābī’s biography, he did not 
research the manuscript history of his works.29 Detailed studies of the transmissions of individual 
books are also tasks for the future, except in the case of al-Madīna al-fāḍila, the transmission of 
which was analysed by Muhsin Mahdi in 1990 and Richard Walzer in his critical edition On the 
Perfect State. 
Many of al-Fārābī’s extant writings deal at least in part with logic and linguistic philosophy. Many of 
these logical writings are, in turn, commentaries on works of ancient Greek-speaking philosophers 
such as Aristotle and Porphyry, but al-Fārābī did also write some independent works on logic and 
the philosophy of language. These include Kitāb al-ḥurūf and parts of Kitāb at-tanbīh ʿalā sabīl as-
saʿāda.30 Other works such as Kitāb al-wāḥid wa’l-waḥda deal primarily with metaphysics. As-
Sīyāsa al-madanīyya is called an “emanationist” text by Druart.31 Al-Fārābī wrote eight works on 
music, of which four are extant, the most significant of these being Kitāb al-mūṣīqā al-kabīr. 
Political philosophy is discussed in several of al-Fārābī’s works, but it is not the main subject of any 
of them. Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm and Kitāb at-tanbīh ʿalā sabīl as-saʿāda as well as al-Madīna al-fāḍila are 
rather difficult to categorise definitively because they cover a wide variety of different topics, 
without focussing on any specific one of them. 
Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma is perhaps the most recondite of all of al-Fārābī’s books, and also perhaps the most 
controversial of his major works in its attribution, because in modern times it is sometimes claimed 
                                                          
28
 For example, the various titles given to Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma, as noted by Corbin p159. 
29
 See bibliography. 
30
 The latter was edited by Jaʿfar Āl Yāsīn and published by Hekmat Publications (Iran) in 1371AH. 
31
 Encyclopædia Iranica “FĀRĀBĪ iii. Metaphysics”. 
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to have been written by Ibn Sīnā.32 This highly enigmatic text deals with conventional philosophy as 
well as gnosis, and also introduces a new concept in philosophy, being the real difference between 
existence and essence in created beings. Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma represents a possible result of this 
research: if dominating Aristotelian influence on al-Fārābī were to be disproven, it is likely that we 
would view Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma quite differently, perhaps more like the mystical works of Ibn Sīnā.33 
We can make mention of some of these books in this study as they are the important works of al-
Fārābī, however we should nonetheless focus on al-Madīna al-fāḍila because this is the most 
relevant book for the topics of revelation and animals. Al-Fārābī also wrote numerous smaller 
treatises and commentaries.34 
Context of al-Fārābī’s writing 
Al-Fārābī lived during the politically fraught but culturally efflorescent times of the collapse of the 
Abbasid Caliphate as an effective government. The intellectual renaissance of the fourth century of 
the Hijra was partially a product of the political upheavals of the time, because smaller and more 
numerous government centres meant more sources of patronage for poets, historians, musicians 
and so on as well as philosophers. People like Ibn Sīnā, al-Mutanabbī and al-Fārābī, leaders of their 
times in their particular fields of medicine, poetry and philosophy, moved around from court to 
court as was beneficial for them. The two major societal changes which caused these political 
developments were the conversion of the majority of the population of the Abbasid Caliphate and 
its successor states to Islam and the economic decline of Iraq. These factors have been discussed in 
some detail by modern scholars of Islamic history.35 Worth mentioning is the fact that the social 
context of Aristotle’s writing is rather similar to that of al-Fārābī’s – both lived during periods of 
                                                          
32
 A critical edition of this book was published in Tehran in 1381AH, edited by Ali Owjabi, who attributes it to 
al-Fārābī. See also Corbin p159, who blames the misattribution to Ibn Sīnā on an anthology published in Cairo 
which included part of Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma under the name of Ibn Sīnā. 
33
 Such as al-Ishārāt w’at-tanbīhāt IV. 
34
 More detailed information on al-Fārābī’s oeuvre can be found in Walzer 1998, Netton and elsewhere. See 
bibliography. 
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widespread conflict and political upheaval, with occasional hostility to philosophy being expressed 
by members of their communities and in societies which had been marked by their large-scale use 
of slave labour.36 This makes it difficult to explain differences of opinion between the two 
philosophers by means of comparing the social or political contexts of their works. 
From the earliest years of Islam, the Umma or Muslim community faced a considerable variety of 
theological or political controversies which could divide its members. Numerous issues such as law, 
rulership, Qurʾānic exegesis and so on needed to be considered by the leaders of the community: 
philosophy was one way of answering some religious and other questions which started to be 
employed from around the third century of the Hijra.37 
Al-Fārābī was one of the earliest of the major philosophers in Islamicate society: the only major 
figure in Islamicate philosophy before him whose works still survive was al-Kindī (c. 185-252).38 The 
cosmopolitan and polyglot background of al-Fārābī’s life and works is attested by consideration of 
his contemporaries and fellow scholars in Baghdad who originated from a variety of places, cultures 
and religious traditions, as well as the various places to which he travelled or may have travelled, 
coming as he did from central Asia to Baghdad, and then moving to Damascus, Aleppo and possibly 
Egypt. The widespread practice of philosophy at this time, evidenced by the corpus of al-Fārābī’s 
writings and those of his fellow philosophers such as Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus, Abū Zakariyyā 
Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdiyy and others, in addition to accounts of patronage from various rulers and courts, 
point to the existence of a free society in which intellectual inquiry was, with some notable 
exceptions, generally valued and encouraged.39 
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The Structure of Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila 
Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila is the best-known Arabic source for al-Fārābī’s political 
philosophy, and while it certainly does feature Platonic and Peripatetic ideas, it would be a mistake 
to ignore the influence of Islamic thought and faith on al-Fārābī and the writer’s originality, 
although the latter may have been unintentional. The main focus of scholarship in modern times on 
this book has been al-Fārābī’s idea of the active intellect and his discussions of flawed states in the 
final two chapters. While these are certainly key areas in his philosophy, in this particular thesis our 
aim is to suggest other influences apart from Aristotle and differences between him and al-Fārābī. 
We can do this most productively by analysing less widely-studied areas, specifically revelation and 
how the natures of animals and humans are related. Aristotle was not primarily concerned with 
flawed states, which is also why the characteristics of flawed states according to al-Fārābī or other 
areas which have been researched extensively by scholars such as Herbert Davidson40 are not 
especially relevant for us here. 
A very wide variety of topics is covered by al-Fārābī in al-Madīna al-fāḍila. These include, in order, 
God and His Nature as the source of all things, astronomy and celestial entities, matter and form, 
becoming or the generation of matter and beings, the faculties of the soul, bodies and 
reproduction, reason, divination, the perfect ruler, the afterlife, philosophy and religion, and then 
in two final chapters a discussion of states which stray from the correct path for various reasons. 
We can see from this list how broad the scope of al-Fārābī’s writing is, but he still discusses his 
ideas about these various subjects in some detail. This is why it makes sense to focus on some 
specific areas so that we can analyse al-Fārābī’s ideas in depth. The most relevant chapters for us, 
then, are 10 to 17 of Walzer’s critical edition On the Perfect State, although some points from other 
chapters will also be discussed. 
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Al-Fārābī’s basic method in writing al-Madīna al-fāḍila was to move from universal points and 
remarks towards particular ones: he discusses God and His Nature first, and aspects of political 
philosophy last. Theoretical philosophy – metaphysics and natural science – takes up most of the 
first ten chapters, then in chapters 11-14 the writer starts to discuss living creatures. The remaining 
chapters are a description of an ideal society and ruler, followed by criticism of political and social 
faults perceived by al-Fārābī. The writer’s focus in all of these areas is on the structure or hierarchy 
of all aspects of creation and its purpose – his point is that justice and order rule nature, and so 
human beings must also attempt to behave in a just and orderly fashion. 
Al-Fārābī’s approach is an important consideration. Al-Madīna al-fāḍila has hitherto been treated in 
secondary literature almost exclusively as a doxographical source. Of course, there are in this book 
many clear passages on such areas as politics or cosmology, but still the question of why al-Fārābī 
wrote al-Madīna al-fāḍila is important for understanding the book itself and how it fits into his 
oeuvre. Ulrich Rudolph has argued persuasively that it is a philosophic treatment of various topics 
related to systematic Islamic theology. The question of the writer’s approach and rationale will be 
considered throughout this study of al-Fārābī’s differences with Aristotle. 
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Chapter Two: Peripatetic and Islamicate Philosophy 
Peripatetic Philosophy and its Influence 
Ancient Greek philosophy began by examining the nature of man. It branched out from this to 
cover everything in existence in some form or another. Pre-Socratic philosophers were mainly 
concerned with cosmology and ontology – these earliest Greek philosophers were distinguished 
from other people who were not philosophers because philosophers rejected mythological 
explanations of events, preferring to use reason to draw their conclusions.41 Socrates (c.470-
399BC), a somewhat mysterious figure, is credited as one of the founders of philosophy even 
though he did not himself write books or treatises.42 His ideas are known mainly through later 
writers such as Plato (c.425-348BC), Socrates’ student, who founded the Academy in Athens and 
wrote numerous philosophical dialogues.43 Plato’s Theory of Forms is the basis of Platonic 
philosophy. 
Aristotle (384-322BC) was the most famous student of Plato, who disagreed with his teacher in 
some areas. Born in northern Greece, he joined Plato’s academy in his late teens and remained 
there for almost twenty years. It was after Plato’s death that Aristotle started to question some of 
Plato’s ideas – he developed his own school of thought, called Aristotelian or Peripatetic after the 
collonades in Athens where Aristotle taught. Aristotelianism was the first comprehensive system to 
cover all branches of what we might now term philosophy.44 Some of the most influential aspects 
of this system include Virtue Ethics, Aristotle’s supposed description of man as a “rational animal” 
and his discussion of the nature of creatures. Aristotle wrote extensively, but it is thought that only 
around one third of his original writings is now extant. 
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Aristotle’s extant writings on animals consist of four main books specifically about animals, as well 
as elements of other works. We know that these and other books by the ancient Athenian 
philosophers were widely studied in the centuries after Aristotle’s death:45 after Alexander the 
Great conquered western Asia and Egypt from the Persians in the fourth century BC, the successor 
states of his empire were ruled by Greeks or Hellenised native people. From about 300BC until the 
chaos of the Roman-Persian war at the start of the seventh century AD, study of the ancient Greek 
classics in fields such as poetry, philosophy, history and mathematics flourished in Alexandria in 
Egypt and Antioch in Syria (modern Turkey), as well as other places including the western areas of 
the Roman Empire. The most important for our purposes of the late antique philosophers 
influenced by Aristotle is Plotinus (c.205-270AD). Born in northern Egypt, Plotinus studied 
philosophy in Alexandria under Ammonius Saccas. Plotinus attempted to simplify Aristotle’s 
philosophy and reconcile it with Plato’s mysticism in such areas as Plotinus’ idea of the One: the 
supreme, transcendent entity which is beyond all categories of being.46 Some of Plotinus’ books 
were later translated into Arabic and misattributed to Aristotle, notably Uthūlūjiyā Arisṭāṭālīs (the 
Theology of Aristotle) which was erroneously considered to be a translation of a genuine work by 
Aristotle.47 
Broadly speaking, before the Islamic conquests of the Levant and Egypt, Hellenised city dwellers 
and native rural populations such as Syrians, Egyptians and Arabs existed together in these areas in 
a state of mutual cultural incomprehension.48 While it is true that some Arabs of the period of 
Jāhiliyya before Islam did leave their homelands to study philosophy or serve the Roman or Persian 
governments,49 they were the exception – until the Abbasid Caliphate, beginning in 132, there were 
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no significant Arab or Muslim philosophic movements and no attempts were made by Arabs or 
Muslims to understand Greek or Graeco-Roman thought in a systematic way. 
Muslims Writing Philosophy: Footnotes to Plato and Aristotle? 
Initial interest in some areas of ancient Greek thought amongst the early Muslims starting in the 
second century of the Hijra was essentially rooted in a desire to put it into practice: Muslims 
wanted to understand ancient works on mathematics, medicine and so on because the knowledge 
which might be gained from them was regarded as useful by the rulers of the Caliphate.50 The 
Caliph ar-Rashīd founded bayt al-ḥikma (the House of Wisdom) in Baghdad in 217, and it was later 
expanded by al-Maʾmūn in order to give force to this current in society and to give it some sort of 
structure.51 Bayt al-ḥikma had dedicated teams of translators who, in concert with other translators 
working independently or for some other patron, produced many translations in a period of about 
two and a half centuries, roughly 150 to 400. Some were made directly from Greek, but many had 
Syriac as an intermediary language. While this translation movement was what made philosophy 
accessible to Muslims – very few of whom knew Greek at that time – we should remember that the 
standard varied widely, owing partially to the inherent difficulties in translating philosophy and its 
technical terms and the linguistic differences between Greek, Syriac and Arabic.52 It is often 
uncertain which translations were available to which philosophers when and where. 
The beginning of philosophy in the Muslim world was not the translation of Greek texts, however. 
Muslims started to become interested in what we might now term philosophic concepts and 
methods because they offered ways of solving some of the problems which arose when trying to 
understand the Qurʾān. A salient example is qiyās (analogy). Early Muslim jurists, before they had 
access to Aristotelian texts on logic translated into Arabic, used qiyās to determine general rules 
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from particular Qurʾānic commands or prohibitions. Philosophic methods and concepts were also 
relevant in the field of theology. Theologians attempting to reconcile God’s omnipotence and 
omniscience with the presence of evil in the world and anthropomorphic verses in the Qurʾān used 
dialectical reasoning to draw their conclusions. 
Islamic philosophers (falāsifa) who had studied translated texts of Plato and Aristotle, conversely, 
criticised dialectical reasoning, which works with premisses that are commonly accepted but not 
logically demonstrated, and regarded it as inferior to their own demonstrative reasoning, which 
works with premisses that are proven as certain and which cannot be challenged. Regarding these 
early developments and conflicts from a modern standpoint, it can be somewhat unclear when 
Islamic philosophy becomes Islamic theology and vice-versa. 
Aristotle in Islamicate Society: Biographies, Texts and Attitudes 
Philosophic and other Ṭabaqāt books contain biographies of Aristotle: for example, Ibn Abī 
Uṣaybiʿa’s ʿUyūn al-Anbāʾ fī Ṭabaqāt al-Aṭibbāʾ. The first biographies in this book concern ancient 
Greek and Roman philosophers and doctors - Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa begins with Asclepius and his 
followers and later physicians such as Hippocrates, and then moves on to figures more famous for 
their philosophy, such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. 
Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa notes some intriguing but probably spurious stories about Aristotle, such as the 
tale of his acceptance of Plato’s philosophy after God revealed Himself to Aristotle in the temple of 
Minerva/Athena in Athens.53 The detailed biography of Aristotle in ʿUyūn al-Anbāʾ contains 
quotations from many other writers contemporary or roughly contemporary with Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, 
including al-Fārābī himself. There is a long list of the compositions of Aristotle, which includes Kitāb 
fī’r-rūḥ (On the Soul),54 Kitāb fī ittikhādh al-ḥayawān (On the Adoption of Animals), Kitāb fī ḥarikat 
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al-ḥayawānāt wa-tashrīḥihā (On the Movement of Animals and their Feeding), Kitāb fī ṭabāʾiʿ al-
ḥayawān (On the Natures of Animals) and several other books on animals.55 Other mediaeval 
biographers who wrote in Arabic about Aristotle, such as Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī56 or ash-Shahrazūrī,57 
give similar lists of books. 
One can note some important points from this brief analysis of biographies of Aristotle, the most 
relevant of which for our purposes is that determining the reliability of the mediaeval Arabic 
versions of Aristotle’s works is problematic. This is because, while it is possible that the books on 
animals which Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa lists were genuinely written by Aristotle, it is more likely that at 
least some of them are misattributions or double-listings of different translations or editions of the 
same book under different titles. 
We cannot be certain which editions of Aristotle al-Fārābī consulted, and we cannot be sure 
whether Aristotle’s biological works were available to al-Fārābī, either in translation or in the 
original Greek. Understanding which editions he may have read is important for us in determining 
how al-Fārābī understood Aristotle, because inevitably the various translated editions of Aristotle’s 
works, mediaeval and modern, differ in some specific details, and moreover translators found 
different ways of rendering the technical philosophic terms used by Aristotle. This is an important 
point because the different Arabic words which might be used to translate one Greek word may 
have slightly different significations and might thus cause the reader to misunderstand or 
misrepresent what Aristotle originally wrote – hence the caveat when talking about al-Fārābī’s 
originality that it may have been unintentional. He could equally have read versions of Aristotle’s 
books which were expanded by translator-philosophers and used the ideas therein in the mistaken 
belief that they really were Aristotle’s and not those of another interpolator or commentator. 
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It may be that al-Fārābī read Kitāb al-ḥayawān, a mediaeval Arabic translation from a Syriac edition 
of Aristotle’s works on animals including some of the books listed by Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa.58 We know, 
conversely, that al-Fārābī definitely could understand some Greek,59 so it is not unreasonable to 
suggest that he might well have read Aristotle in Greek using help from some of his contemporaries 
who read this language fluently.60 That said, there is no indication that he had any knowledge of 
Syriac.61 Bearing in mind these general statements on this matter, we ought to consult the Greek of 
Aristotle in the main in order best to evaluate what Aristotle himself said rather than how he was 
interpreted and translated. 
Analysis of some of the biographies of Aristotle which circulated in mediaeval Islamicate society 
backs up the general point that there necessarily must be some differences between his thought 
and those of Muslim philosophers such as al-Fārābī. While biographers did sometimes insert 
dubious anecdotes about God revealing Himself to Aristotle, there was no serious attempt to cast 
Aristotle as a religious scholar or a Muslim before Islam. Al-Fārābī’s studies in Peripatetic 
philosophy and his interest in ancient Greek logic did not interfere with his religious faith or lead 
biographers to call him an apostate – this means that he did not commit himself totally to 
Aristotle’s teachings, because some of them run counter to Islam. The veracity of this statement 
can be demonstrated by analysing some key passages from al-Madīna al-Fāḍila. 
The basic question which faces us when looking at al-Madīna al-Fāḍila and other works is whether 
al-Fārābī came up with his ideas independently or sourced them from origins other than Aristotle. 
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This is why understanding what Aristotle wrote, and indeed where he wrote it, is relevant. We will 
have cause to note that ho theos, “God”, or sometimes “god” (i.e. of ancient Greek paganism), as 
written by Aristotle does not have the same religious significance which a Muslim such as al-Fārābī 
would apply to it. An important term to be researched is fiṭra, variously translated as “primordial 
nature”, “original human disposition” and in other ways. Similarities between the two writers could 
be coincidence, or al-Fārābī may have arrived at his ideas independently of Aristotle, and only later 
realised after reading the latter’s books that they were in agreement in some areas. Moreover, al-
Fārābī definitely did disagree with Aristotle in many cases, sometimes because of his own personal 
analysis, and sometimes, for example in areas such as revelation and Prophethood, because 
disagreement with ancient Peripatetic philosophy is religiously mandated for Muslims. 
This hypothesis can be tested by quoting relevant sections of al-Madīna al-Fāḍila and attempting to 
analyse what they can tell us, while also comparing what Aristotle had to say about the matter at 
hand and looking with care at secondary sources where relevant. The focus is on ideas, however 
considerations of literary style, structure, methodology and other features of al-Fārābī’s writing are 
also important for a full examination of the relevant sections of the main primary source. 
24 
 
Chapter Three: Revelation and the Revealer 
God in al-Fārābī and His Interactions with Man 
One of the most crucial differences between the God of revealed religion in whom al-Fārābī 
believed and Aristotle’s First Cause or Prime Mover is God’s involvement in the world and His wish 
to reveal Himself to humanity. We know from al-Fārābī’s biography and milieu that he was a 
Muslim living in a society where revealed religions were prominent, even though we also know 
from his biography that he used Aristotle’s ideas in some places. For this reason we ought to 
approach reading al-Fārābī’s books from a neutral standpoint, without assuming which of the many 
influences on the writer dominated. Some modern scholars, such as Richard Walzer in particular, 
are inclined to take the Aristotelian or Hellenistic paradigm for granted when commenting on al-
Madīna al-fāḍila. When discussing al-Fārābī’s political philosophy, Walzer assumes that there must 
be a Greek predecessor for this:62 
“One obviously wonders who the author of this unusual synthesis of Aristotle and Plato may 
have been or, if this question cannot be answered, whether at least his place in the history of 
later Greek philosophy can somehow be circumscribed.” 
 
One perhaps wonders instead why we are looking for this predecessor when there is no evidence 
that he existed, much less that he influenced al-Fārābī. Walzer later admits that there is an Islamic 
context for al-Fārābī’s political thought,63 but we should remember that this could equally be 
applied to all of the content of al-Madīna al-fāḍila. 
Sometimes this Islamic context is very obvious, such as when al-Fārābī discusses what happens 
when all the intellects come together in one person:64 
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اذإو لصح كلذ في لاك يَءزج هتوق ةقطانلا اهمو ةيرظنلا ةيلمعلاو ثم في هتوق ةلّيختلما ناك اذه ناسنلإا وه يذلا ىَحُوي ،هيلإ نوكيف للها  ّزع 
 ّلجو يِحُوي هيلإ طّسوتب لقعلا ،لاّعفلا نوكيف ام ضيفي نم للها كرابت لىاعتو لىإ لقعلا لاّعفلا هضيفي لقعلا لاّعفلا لىإ هلقع لعفنلما طّسوتب 
لقعلا دافتسلما ثم لىإ هتوق ،ةلّيختلما نوكيف ابم ضيفي هنم لىإ هلقع لعفنلما اميكح افوسليف لاقعتمو ىلع مامتلا65 ابمو ضيفي هنم لىإ ةوقلا 
ةلّيختلما اّيبن ارذنمو ابم نوكيس ابرمخو ابم وه نلآا نم تايئزلجا دوجوم.  
When this occurs in both parts of his rational faculty, namely the theoretical and practical 
rational faculties, and also in his representative faculty, then it is this man who receives 
revelation, and God Almighty grants him revelation through the mediation of the active 
intellect, so that the emanation from God Almighty to the active intellect is passed on to his 
passive intellect through the mediation of his acquired intellect, and then to the faculty of 
representation. Thus he is, through the emanation from the active intellect to his passive 
intellect, a wise man, a philosopher and an accomplished thinker, and through the emanation of 
the active intellect to his faculty of representation a visionary Prophet who warns of things to 
come and tells of particular things at present.  
The main significance of this passage is that it is the first specific mention of God, that is to say 
Allāh, the god of revealed religion, in al-Madīna al-fāḍila. The text of this passage clearly 
demonstrates that al-Fārābī believes in God who reveals Himself to humanity and selects from 
amongst humans Prophets who preach to the other members of society. This is a key aspect of al-
Fārābī’s political philosophy, but it is also centrally important for the entire system because we can 
note from this section that the writer’s conception of God is, in this case, very similar to that of 
conventional Islamic belief at the time while also being quite radically divorced from that of 
Aristotle and other ancient Greek philosophers. The writer does not give any indication before this 
section that he will discuss revealed religion – what we might infer from this is that al-Fārābī took 
for granted the idea that Prophets have the highest level of intellect in his system and receive 
revelation from God. These ideas run counter to the Aristotelian concept of the Prime Mover or 
impersonal God. 
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Part of the unfamiliar complexity of this passage, however, lies in exactly how a visionary Prophet 
gains his revelation from God: he receives revelation as a result of emanation from Him. Emanation 
also applies to interactions between the intellects and faculties of the soul, so it is clear that al-
Fārābī does not use the word and its derived forms as a specific technical term applied only to God, 
but the fact that it can be applied to God also is significant for understanding what the writer 
believed about the Nature of God and how he interacts with people.66 A possible result of this 
research could also be adumbrated here: new ideas could be suggested on the topic of the 
relationship between philosophy and Prophethood. We might re-examine this little-studied 
passage from a religious point of view, rather than treating it as pure philosophy, if the thesis that 
al-Fārābī did not make Aristotle his central focus were accepted.  
The only other direct mentions of God in al-Madīna al-fāḍila occur during al-Fārābī’s explanation of 
the different kinds of flawed states:67 
مأوا ةنيدلما ةقسافلا يهف تيلا اهؤارآ ءارآ ةلضافلا يهو ملعت ةداعسلا للهاو  ّزع  ّلجو نياوثلاو لقعلاو لاّعفلا لكو ءيش هليبس نأ هملعي لهأ 
ةنيدلما ةلضافلا ،انهودقتعيو نكلو نوكت لاعفأ اهلهأ لاعفأ لهأ ندلما ةيلهالجا .ةنيدلماو ةلّدبلما يه تيلا تناك اهؤارآ الهاعفأو في يمدقلا ءارآ 
لهأ ةنيدلما ةلضافلا ،الهاعفأو يرغ انهأ تلّدبت تلخدف اهيف ءارآ يرغ كلت تلاحتساو الهاعفأ لىإ يرغ كلت .ةنيدلماو ةّلاضلا يه تيلا  ّمؤت دعب 
ايحاته هذه ةداعسلا68 دقتعتو في للها  ّزع  ّلجو فيو نياوثلا فيو لقعلا لاّعفلا ءارآ ةدساف لا حلصت اهيلع لاو نإ تذِخُأ ىلع انهأ تلايثتم 
تلاييتخو اله .نوكيو اهسيئر لولأا نمم مهوأ هنأ   ىحوُم هيلإ نم يرغ نأ نوكي ،كلذك نوكيو دق لمعتسا في كلذ تاهيومتلا  وتاعداخلما 
رورغلاو.  
The sinful 69 state is that whose views are the views of the perfect state. It knows happiness, God 
Almighty, the existents of the second order, the active intellect and everything which is known 
by the people of the perfect state and in which they believe, however the actions of its people 
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are the actions of the people of the pagan 70 states. The changed state is that whose views and 
actions were, in the past, the views of the perfect state and its actions, but they have been 
changed: other views have entered it and its actions have been transformed into other actions. 
The state which strays from the straight path 71is the state which aims at happiness after this life 
and holds above God Almighty, the existents of the second order and the active intellect 
depraved and useless beliefs, even if they were taken as representations and symbols. Its first ruler 
was a man who pretended to be receiving revelation while he was not, and in order to make this 
impression he used falsifications, cheating and deceptions. 
The most immediately noteworthy aspect of this section is the prominent mentions of God. 
Although the context here is political, we can still determine from this part of al-Madīna al-fāḍila 
the importance of religious belief in the writer’s philosophy: one of the first markers of the perfect 
state, and one which is partially or formerly shared by the flawed states, is belief in God Almighty.  
Al-Fārābī uses religious terminology when he introduces the concept of the pagan state. The word 
jāhiliyya functioning as an adjective denotes something pagan or pertaining to pre-Islamic times.72 
Walzer incorrectly translates this word as “ignorant” and talks about “ignorant cities”, but for us to 
adopt this rendering we would have to ignore the penultimate letter, yāʾ, in jāhiliyya and read 
jāhila instead.73 That al-Fārābī describes a group of states using the terminology of revealed religion 
demonstrates the centrality of religious faith in his system, and specifically it demonstrates the 
importance of revelation – there can be no pagan state which has accepted revelation from God 
and applied it. 
The writer also uses religious terminology to describe the other flawed states, al-madīna al-fāsiqa 
and al-madīna aḍ-ḍālla. These words, commonly translated as “sinful” and “erring” respectively, 
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are used extensively in the Qurʾān. We can take as an example a prominent verse in which they are 
used together:74 
 نِإ ٱ َه لل  َلا ىْحَتْسَي َنأ  َبِرْضَي   لاَثَم ا م   ةَضوُع َب اَمَف اَه َقْو َف ا مََأف ٱ َنيِذ ل  ْاوُنَمآ  َنوُمَلْع َي َف  ُه َنأ ٱ  قَْلْ نِم  ْمِهبِّ ر ا َمأَو ٱ َنيِذ ل  ْاوُرَفَك  َنوُلوُق َي َف آَذاَم  َدَاَرأ 
ٱ ُه لل   َِبِّاَذ  َثَم  لا   لِضُي  ِهِب   ايرِثَك يِدْه َيَو  ِهِب   ايرِثَك اَمَو   لِضُي  ِهِب   لاِإ ٱ  َفْل َيِقِس  
God does not disdain to use an example, even of a gnat, or what is above it. Those who believe 
know that it is the Truth from their Lord, but those who are false say “What did God want with 
this example?” He leads many astray by it and He guides many by it, but He does not lead 
anyone astray except those who sin. 
Fāsiq clearly has a moral value, and although ḍalla and its derived forms did originally have 
descriptive meanings they took on new religious connotations after their use in the Qurʾān which 
persisted from mediaeval times until the present day.75 This comparison demonstrates that al-
Fārābī may have used these terms because of their religious connotations in order to emphasise 
the importance of religious belief in his philosophic system.76 For this reason he did not use more 
general terms to describe the flawed states: he did not talk about al-madīna as-sayyiʾa or al-
madīna ash-sharīra, for example. 
We can also find an Islamic influence in al-Fārābī’s idea of the changed state. The idea that this 
state formerly held correct views and later changed them bears a striking resemblance to the 
concept of bidʿa, innovation, in Islam. Innovators changed Islamic practices and ideas – in doing so, 
they removed themselves from true Islam.77 Thus we can suggest that al-Fārābī views the principles 
of the perfect state as being the ideal principles of the Muslim community. Thus also, part of the 
reason that al-Fārābī uses Allāh ʿizza wa-jall in a political context is to make a contrast with 
Aristotle’s idea of the Prime Mover. 
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Although these are the only instances of the specific word Allāh being used in al-Madīna al-fāḍila, 
we know by comparison with al-Fārābī’s other books that he also means God when he talks about 
the First Cause:78 
لّولأاف وه يذلا يغبني نأ دقتُعي هيف ّهنأ وه ،هللإا79 وهو ببسلا بيرقلا دوجول نياوثلا دوجولو لقعلا لاّعفلا.  
It is appropriate that the First [Cause] is that which is considered to be God, and it is the 
immediate reason for the existence of the existents of the second order and for the existence of 
the active intellect. 
This passage demonstrates that al-Fārābī uses as-sabab al-awwal (or simply al-awwal for short) to 
mean God. Having understood this, we can look at the first chapters of al-Madīna al-fāḍila for more 
information on the Nature of God in al-Fārābī’s view. 
In chapter 2 of al-Madīna al-fāḍila, al-Fārābī talks about the First Cause as the origin of all being, 
and he also describes in some detail the Nature of the First Cause:80 
و[ببسلا لولأا ]سيل مسقني لىإ ،يئيش نوكي اهمدحإب رهوتج هتاذ رخلآابو لوصح ءيش رخآ ،هنع امك نأ انل ،يئيش رهوجتن اهمدحإب 
وهو قطنلا بتكنو رخلآاب وهو ةعانص ،ةباتكلا لب تاذ ةدحاو رهوجو دحاو هب نوكي هرهوتج هبو هنيعب لصيح هنع ءيش رخآ.  
لاو اضيأ جاتيح في نأ ضيفي نع هدوجو  ُدوجو ءيش رخآ لىإ ءيش يرغ هتاذ نوكي هيف  ]...[سيلو هدوجو ابم ضيفي هنع دوجو هيرغ  َلمكأ 
نم هدوجو يذلا هب ،هرهوتج لاو هدوجو يذلا هب هرهوتج لمكأ نم يذلا ضيفي هنع دوجو ،هيرغ لب اهم اعيجم تاذ ةدحاو.  
لاو نكيم اضيأ نأ نوكي هل  قئاع نم نأ ضيفي هنع دوجو ،هيرغ لا نم هسفن لاو نم جراخ لاصأ.  
[The First Cause] is not divided into two things, by one of which His essence becomes substance 
and by the other something else occurs from Him as we have two things: we become substance 
by one of them, namely articulated speech, and we write by the other, namely the art of writing. 
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But He is one essence and one substance through which He becomes substance and through 
which other things occur. 
Nor does He need, in order that the existence of something else emanate from His existence, 
anything except His own essence. […] His existence is not, by the existence of something else 
emanating from it, more perfect than His existence by which He becomes substance, nor is His 
existence by which He becomes substance more perfect than the existence of something else 
which emanates from it, but they are both one essence. 
It is also not possible at all that there might be something to prevent that the existence of 
something else emanates from Him, not from Himself or from outside Him. 
At issue in this passage are several points, the most important of which is the concept of 
emanation, fayḍ. Not only did Aristotle never go into detail about the nature of the Prime Mover, 
but he also did not use any words related to emanation or similar concepts, although Plotinus did 
use related Greek words in his writings.81  
Al-Fārābī may have included more details on the Nature of the First Cause than Aristotle did on the 
Prime Mover as a result of the former’s wish to express his ideas more fully and accurately, or 
indeed to distance himself from Aristotle and strengthen his Muslim credentials. It is indeed 
possible that these statements about the absolute unity and indivisible nature of the First Cause 
are connected with contemporary or near-contemporary theological debates about the Oneness of 
God amongst groups like the Muʿtazila, as argued by Rudolph.82 
Fayḍ can be simply a philosophic way of saying waḥy.83 When we compare section 10 of chapter 
15,84 we can see that the visionary prophet is so because of an emanation from God, which in 
theological terms is revelation from God. It is significant, however, that nuṭq, articulated speech, is 
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mentioned by al-Fārābī in connection with emanation because we know that God speaks directly to 
the world and things in the Qurʾān:85 
 ُعيِدَب ٱ  َم سل  َو ِت  َوٱ ِضْرَلأ اَذِإَو   ىَضَق   ارَْمأ َا  نَِّإَف  ُلوُق َي  ُهَل  ْنُك  ُنوُكَي َف  
He is the Originator of the Heavens and the Earth, and if He decrees something He says only 
“Be!” and so it is. 
God’s speaking to things in order to make them may have been what al-Fārābī had in mind when he 
discussed the indivisibility of the First Cause and how articulated speech is separate from writing 
for humans. God decreed that people follow His will, which was why He revealed the Qurʾān, itself 
a form of emanation. 
Perhaps the most important passage demonstrating the nature of the perfect state is the beginning 
of chapter 17 on philosophy and religion. Al-Fārābī describes what should be known by the people 
of the perfect state:86 
 ]...[ ،هب فصوي ام عيجمو لولأا ببسلا ةفرعم الهوأ )١( ءايشأ يهف ةلضافلا ةنيدلما لهأ عيجم اهملعي نأ يغبني تيلا ةكترشلما ءايشلأا امأف
(٦ )ثم سيئرلا لولأا فيكو نوكي يحولا ]...[  
As for the things in common which all the people of the perfect state ought to know, they are: 
(1) knowledge of the First Cause and all how He is described […] (6) then the first ruler and how 
there is revelation […] 
Having established that al-Fārābī viewed God and the First Cause as one and the same, it is 
significant that he would state that knowledge of the First Cause is the first thing which the people 
of the perfect state ought to know, and that belief in revelation also makes the list. This is because 
such statements demonstrate al-Fārābī’s disagreement with Aristotle and agreement with Islamic 
teaching. 
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Differences from Aristotle’s Conception of God 
Al-Fārābī’s philosophy, both of God specifically and when he describes God using the term the First 
Cause, means that any human notion of the existence of God cannot progress beyond acceptance 
of the fact that His existence has nothing whatsoever in common with what we mean when we talk 
about anything else, except in some crucial areas such a revelation and emanation.87 We need to 
bear this fact in mind when comparing al-Fārābī with Aristotle. The most immediate difference 
between Aristotle and al-Fārābī is the latter’s acceptance of divine revelation. In ancient Athens, 
without Islam and the Qurʾān or any other form of accepted divine revelation or expression, it 
would have been impossible for Aristotle to use revelation as a concept and include it in his 
philosophy. Indeed, the way that Aristotle describes God is very different from how a Muslim such 
as al-Fārābī would have understood His nature:88 
We must be careful not to ignore the question whether “soul” can be defined in a single 
unambiguous formula, as is the case with animal, or whether we must not give a separate 
formula for each of it, as we do for horse, dog, man, god, in the latter case the universal animal - 
and so too every other common predicate - being treated either as nothing at all or as a later 
product.89 
Describing God as “the universal animal” would have been unacceptable to al-Fārābī. As we will see 
below,90 he held the belief that animals are created by God, and God is the source of creation. It 
should also be remembered that, as noted above,91 al-Fārābī emphatically states that the First 
Cause cannot be divided, rather He is one and indivisible. This means that al-Fārābī rejects the idea 
that a separate formula could be given for each part of the First Cause, God. 
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Aristotle does not himself use the word ho theos, God, in his Metaphysics until Book 12:92  
If, then, the happiness which God always enjoys is as great as that which we enjoy sometimes, it 
is wondrous; and if it is greater, this is still more wondrous. Nevertheless it is so. Moreover, life 
belongs to God. For the operation of the mind is life, and God is that operation; and the essential 
operation of God is life most good and eternal. We hold, then, that God is a living being, 
eternal, most good; and therefore life and a continuous eternal existence belong to God; for that 
is what God is.93 
Even here Aristotle does not make any mention of revelation or Prophets, necessarily because 
these concepts did not exist at that time, and certainly not in the same way as mediaeval Muslims 
understood them. It is also worth noting that while al-Fārābī does talk about God having feelings of 
pleasure,94 he does not talk about God having emotions or feelings such as happiness, although he 
does frequently discuss human happiness in connection with pointing out the flaws of certain 
states.95 Al-Fārābī explicitly states that God’s pleasure cannot be compared in any way to human 
pleasure or happiness.96 In al-Madīna al-fāḍila, there is no sense that God has the emotion of 
happiness or that any of His wishes can be likened to human wishes or inclinations. Nowhere in al-
Madīna al-fāḍila does al-Fārābī state that God is life. He also does not say that God is continuous 
eternal existence. While it can be understood from al-Madīna al-fāḍila that God is alive and God 
exists continuously and eternally, the writer does not at any point state that life and God are 
synonymous. 
Walzer notes in his commentary on al-Madīna al-fāḍila97 that the Arabic word for angel98 could be 
used to render the Greek word theos. Even though there are no instances of this occurring in al-
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Fārābī’s writing, if true it would demonstrate a different attitude in mediaeval Arabic philosophical 
writing from that held by ancient Greek philosophers, because in revealed religion angels are 
created by the One God, whereas varying accounts exist in ancient Greek paganism for how there 
might be numerous different gods and how the word theos might be applied to several distinct 
entities. Colmo suggests that sometimes al-Fārābī’s views conflict with both Islam and ancient 
philosophy because al-Fārābī viewed the emanation of the world from God as a necessary 
occurrence, even though this would mean that God’s free will is circumscribed.99 
Al-Fārābī’s Use and Opinion of Independent Reasoning 
For al-Fārābī, “philosophic tradition” is an oxymoron, as Colmo notes,100 quoting and disagreeing 
with Walzer:101 
“But Aristotelian cosmology and biological research (enriched by the results obtained by 
Hellenistic scientists) were now accepted as almost dogmatic truth. Both late Greek 
philosophers and their Muslim followers acclaimed almost unanimously and without 
substantial reservation a very complicated structure laboriously established by Aristotelians 
and Platonists and others. They no longer fully realised ‘the hypothetical character of 
postulates, to which centuries of unquestioned tradition had given the appearance of self-
evidence.’” 
In the case of al-Fārābī, this is not true. As we have seen in this chapter, and will continue to 
examine in the following sections on animals and man and the soul, al-Fārābī clearly replaced some 
Aristotelian beliefs with Muslim ones. We should also remember, though, that he had his own 
original beliefs which could be in conformity with neither Islam nor Peripatetic philosophy. 
Al-Fārābī’s original thought, which may be seen to occur in contrast with Islam to an extent, can be 
demonstrated effectively by analysis of his statements on happiness and the afterlife. Let us 
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examine al-Fārābī’s own definition of happiness from al-Madīna al-fāḍila:102 
لوصحو تلاوقعلما لولأا ناسنلإل وه هلامكتسا ،لولأا هذهو تلاوقعلما انَّإ تلعُج هل اهلمعنسيل في نأ يرصي لىإ هلامكتسا ،يرخلأا كلذو 
وه ةداعسلا .يهو نأ يرصت سفن ناسنلإا نم لامكلا في دوجولا لىإ ثيح لا جاتتح في اهماوق لىإ ،ةّدام كلذو نأ يرصت في ةلجم ءايشلأا 
ةئيبرلا نع ماسجلأا فيو ةلجم رهاولجا ةقرافلما ،ّداوملل نأو ىقبت ىلع كلت الالْ امئاد ادبأ ]...[  
The first obtaining of the intelligibles for a person is his first perfection, and yet these intelligibles 
are made for him so that he might use them to reach his ultimate perfection, which is happiness. 
This means that the person’s soul reaches perfection in existence such that it does not need 
matter for its support, because it becomes one of the incorporeal things and one of the 
immaterial substances and it remains in this state forever […] 
Al-Fārābī defines saʿāda as a human person’s ultimate perfection. While we can note that this 
differs from the common definition of the word,103 the striking element of this passage is how the 
writer then defines perfection in existence. One might think that this is surely unobtainable by 
humans: if a soul was not already without need for matter, it is difficult to see how it might achieve 
this state except by dying and moving to the next life.  
This challenging passage begs more questions than it answers. It would be tempting to label this a 
mystical passage and compare it with some passages from Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma, a mystical work ascribed 
to al-Fārābī , but any such research is a task for the future. 
In the following section from the chapter on reason from al-Madīna al-fāḍila, al-Fārābī describes 
the purpose of happiness:104 
ةداعسلاو يه يرلخا بولطلما هتاذل تسيلو بلطُت لاصأ لاو في تقو نم تاقولأا لانيل ابِّ ءيش رخآ سيلو اهءارو يشء رخآ نكيم نأ هلاني ناسنلإا 
مظعأ اهنم .لاعفلأاو ةيدارلإا تيلا عفنت في غولب ةداعسلا يه لاعفلأا ،ةليملجا تائيلهاو تاكللماو تيلا اهنع ردصت هذه لاعفلأا يه ،لئاضفلا هذه يه 
تايرلخا لا لجلأ اتهاوذ لب انَّإ يه تايرخ لجلأ عسلاةدا.  
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Happiness is the good thing which is sought for its own sake: it is not sought at all at any time 
whatsoever for obtaining something else through it, and there is not beyond it any other thing 
which is greater than it for one to obtain. The voluntary actions which benefit in reaching 
happiness are fine actions, and the dispositions and habits which proceed from these actions are 
virtues: these are good things not for their own sake but instead they are good things for the sake 
of happiness. 
Happiness exists as a goal above religious obligation or any other purpose. Al-Fārābī does not reject 
the Islamic teaching that true happiness occurs in the afterlife, but he places happiness for its own 
sake as a higher goal than anything else in our mortal lives. This means that happiness is a higher 
purpose than religious observance – and yet some of the flawed states know happiness as well as 
God.105 One wonders how this can be so. Regardless of the exact meaning of these difficult 
passages in chapter 13 and how we wish to fit together the ideas in them, we can certainly say that 
the depth and manner of explanation of such ideas are original to al-Fārābī, demonstrative of his 
ability to reason independently and view of the benefit in doing so.  
Another notable example of al-Fārābī’s original thought is his description of what happens to the 
inhabitants of the various states after they die. When talking about the afterlife in connection with 
flawed states, the writer says that the inhabitants of the pagan or pre-Islamic state will suffer total 
destruction, including destruction of their souls, when they die:106 
لهأف هذه ندلما :امأ ندم ةيلهالجا نإف مهسفنأ ىقبت يرغ ةلمكتسم ةجاتمحو في ماوقاه لىإ ةّدام  ورضةر ذإ لم مستري اهيف مسر ةقيقح ىَوِس 
تلاوقعلما لولأا لاصأ ]...[ .ءلاؤه مه نوكلالها نورئاصلاو لىإ مدعلا ىلع لاثم ام نوكي هيلع مئاهبلا عابسلاو يعافلأاو.  
As for the people of these states, the souls of the pagan state remain imperfect and necessarily 
requiring matter for their preservation as no truth has been impressed upon them at all apart 
from the first intelligibles. […] These are the people who perish and become nothing, just like 
cattle, beasts of prey and snakes. 
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We will return to the meaning of this passage later in order to consider its statements about 
animals,107 but what is to be noted in connection with reasoning is the total destruction of the 
people of the pagan state once their physical bodies are destroyed. This would appear to be in 
conflict with Islamic teaching.  
The Qurʾān says that evil people will be condemned to Hell, and it also says that those who seek 
only for the goods of this world will go to Hell after dying.108 By saying that the inhabitants of 
flawed states are simply destroyed after death, al-Fārābī simply ignores Islamic doctrine on the 
matter and replaces it with his own ideas.109 
Brief mention can be made of how al-Ghazālī misunderstood al-Fārābī’s belief in the destruction of 
the souls of the inhabitants of the pagan state after death. Al-Ghazālī grouped philosophers 
together in various different categories in his book al-Munqidh min aḍ-ḍalāl, one of which is the 
naturalists. He claimed that these naturalists denied the eternity of the soul, and that they thus 
denied the existence of Heaven, Hell, Resurrection and Judgement.110 In the case of al-Fārābī 
though, this is not entirely true, because al-Fārābī only denied the eternity of the souls of the pagan 
state’s inhabitants, while preserving a belief in revelation along with other ideas which come with 
it. He did not deny Resurrection or Judgement, he simply suggested his own ideas about the 
destruction of sinful or corrupt souls. We can thus understand something of the origin of the idea 
that al-Fārābī was classed as an Aristotelian philosopher by noting al-Ghazālī’s failure fully and 
accurately to understand and represent this significant aspect of al-Fārābī’s philosophy. 
As an example of al-Fārābī’s attitude towards original thought, we can turn to his discussion of how 
the First Cause can be known by people. After discussing the matters known by the people of the 
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virtuous state,111 the writer talks about how these things can be known:112 
هذهو ءايشلأا فرعت دحأب يهجو امإ نأ مسترت في مهسوفن امك يه ةدوجوم امإو نأ مسترت مهيف ةبسانلماب ،ليثمتلاو كلذو نأ لُصَيح في 
مهسوفن اتهلااثم تيلا اهيكاتح .ءامكحف ةنيدلما مه نيذلا نوفرعي هذه يهابرب رئاصببو ،مهسفنأ نمو يلي ءامكلْا نوفرعي هذه ىلع ام هي 
ةدوجوم رئاصبب ءامكلْا اعاّبتا مله اقيدصتو مله ةقثو ،مبِّ نوقابلاو مهنم انهوفرعي تلااثلماب تيلا اهيكاتح منهلأ لا ةّنُم في منهاهذأ اهمّهفتل 
ىلع ام يه ةدوجوم امإ عبطلاب امإو ةداعلاب .اتلِكو اهم ناتفرعم  ّلاإ نأ تيلا ءامكحلل لضفأ لا ةلامح.  
These things are known in one of two ways, either by being impressed 113 on their souls as they 
exist or by being impressed on them through affinity and symbolism. In that case, symbols arise 
in them which reproduce them. The philosophers of the city are those who know these things 
through demonstrative proofs and their own insight. Those who follow the philosophers know 
them as they exist through the insight of the philosophers, following them, believing them and 
trusting them. Other people know them through symbols which reproduce them because there 
is no way for their minds to understand them as they exist, neither by nature nor habit. Both of 
these are kinds of knowledge, although that of the philosophers is definitely better. 
The idea that there are two different kinds of knowledge of God and His nature and 
commandments supports the notion that al-Fārābī valued individual reason: the philosophers use 
demonstrative proofs and their own insight and, it is implied, religious proofs and revelation, 
whereas other people who are neither philosophers nor their followers use only religious proofs 
and revelation. Religion, thus, is an imitative representation of philosophic truth for those unable to 
understand the latter – without the Qurʾān, philosophers would still be able to arrive at such beliefs 
as the Oneness of God. As above,114 examination of this passage would become important as a 
result of the acceptance of the idea that al-Fārābī broke with Aristotle. A fresh analysis of the 
relationship between religious and philosophic knowledge according to al-Fārābī might be 
undertaken in the future which could give further support to the theory of the uniqueness of 
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Islamic philosophy. 
If we were to accept the assertion that the commonly-assumed Aristotelian context of al-Fārābī’s 
writing ought to be replaced with an Islamic and independent one, “impressed on their souls” is a 
highly significant statement. It reminds us of the idea of fiṭra,115 but also has a mystical implication, 
because something impressed or ordained upon the soul is not something acquired by logical 
thought and reasoning. If it were to be accepted that al-Fārābī can be viewed as being outside the 
Aristotelian tradition in some areas, further research in the future into the presence of mysticism in 
his work may yield results. 
Lameer, referring specifically to the first two lines of the text quoted above, believes that Plato may 
have inspired al-Fārābī’s view,116 and yet this assertion is not supported by analysis of key sections 
of Plato’s work. Let us take as an example the same passage which from Republic VI which Lameer 
quotes:117 
“And would you also say,” I said, “that differentiating between truth and untruth is like defining 
the opinable118 against the knowable119 and the likeness120 against that of which it is a 
likeness?”121 
While Plato also distinguishes between two types of realisation – and it is quite possible that later 
philosophers such as Plotinus who were influenced by both Plato and Aristotle might have accepted 
this assertion – these two types are different from those suggested by al-Fārābī. Realisation is a 
suitable term to describe the category including opinion and knowledge, because clearly al-Fārābī 
regarded philosophic and religious truth as different kinds of knowledge. He specifically stated that 
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both are kinds of knowledge.122 It is more likely that this idea is original than that it is a significantly 
altered version of Plato’s statement above as Lameer claims, because al-Fārābī’s thoughts on the 
matter contradict Plato’s. 
While we should stop short of calling al-Fārābī a theologian, Rudolph’s preliminary study123 of 
theological themes and influences does offer some compelling arguments. His chapter “Reflections 
on al-Fārābī’s Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila” compares al-Madīna al-fāḍila with some 
theological works of the period. Rudolph’s striking conclusion that the structure and overall content 
of al-Ashʿarī’s Kitāb al-Lumaʿ, al-Māturīdī’s Kitāb at-tawḥīd and al-Juwaynī’s Kitāb al-Irshād have 
close parallels with al-Madīna al-fāḍila seems to be persuasive and based on convincing evidence. 
What this might mean is that al-Fārābī was attempting to reconcile Islamic theology with Islamicate 
philosophy, and this, in turn, might explain why there are specific references to revealed religion in 
a book ostensibly about philosophy qua philosophy, although significant research would be 
required before the theological aspects of al-Fārābī’s thought could be described in detail. 
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Chapter Four: Man’s Nature and that of Animals 
Faculties of the Soul and Political Comparisons 
Animals and man necessarily have some basic commonalities in most philosophic systems, because 
both are usually said to have been created by either God or an impersonal first cause. Thus al-
Fārābī divides animals into two categories, speaking (or rational) and non-speaking (or non-
rational). Al-Fārābī first discusses this distinction in chapter 4, on sublunary existents:124 
ماسجلأاو ةيعيبطلا نم هذه يه تاّسقطسلاا لثم رانلا ءاولهاو ءالماو ضرلأاو امو اهسناج نم راخبلا بيهللاو يرغو ،كلذ ةيندعلماو لثم 
ةراجلْا امو ،اهسناج ،تابنلاو ناويلْاو يرغ ،قطانلا ناويلْاو قطانلا.  
The natural sublunary bodies are elements like fire, air, water, earth and what is of their genus, 
such as steam, flame and other things; minerals like rocks and what is of their genus; plants; 
animals without speech,125 and speaking animals.126 
Given that man is clearly a sublunary existent, even though he is not mentioned specifically by 
name here, he must fit into one of these categories. “Speaking animals” would appear to be the 
closest, and in suggesting that humans fit into this category we discover much about the closeness 
of humans and animals according to the writer. Humans are described as animals, although 
modified by an active participle. An important question which is raised by this passage is how one 
ought to render nāṭiq. 
In chapter 8 of al-Madīna al-fāḍila, on becoming, the writer discusses how living creatures 
necessarily occur as a result of the occurrence of prime matter, elements and other things and their 
mixing together:127 
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تاّيندعلماف ثدتح طلاتخاب برقأ لىإ تاّسقطسلاا  ّلقأو ابيكرت نوكيو اهدعب نم تاّسقطسلاا بُترِب  ّلقأ .ثديح تابنلا طلاتخاب رثكأ 
اهنم ابيكرت دعبأو نع تاّسقطسلاا بُترِب رثكأ .ناويلْاو يرغ قطانلا ثديح طلاتخاب رثكأ ابيكرت نم تابنلا .ناسنلإاو هدحو وه لايذ 
ثديح نع طلاتخلاا يرخلأا.  
Minerals occur by a mixture which is nearer to the elements and which is less complex, and their 
distance from the elements is less in rank. Plants occur by a mixture which is more complex than 
theirs, and they are removed from the elements by a further stage. Animals without speech128 
occur by a mixture which is more complex than that of plants. Man alone is that which occurs 
by the last mixture. 
The commonality we can note between animals and humans in al-Madīna al-fāḍila is that both 
occur as a necessary result of the various mixtures between prime matter, elements etc. which al-
Fārābī discusses.129 While it should be noted that al-Fārābī consciously deviated from Aristotle in his 
descriptions of prime matter130 and that al-Fārābī also chose not to differentiate the two Arabic 
words mizāj and ikhtilāṭ which are both used interchangeably for “mixture”,131 the question is how 
to read nāṭiq. One might either take it literally, or assert that al-ḥayawān an-nāṭiq seems to refer to 
Aristotle’s purported description of man as a “rational animal”. It would appear that animals are 
contrasted with humanity by means of the writer’s clarification that they do not speak, or that they 
are not rational.  
The most important question which is raised by this passage is which sense of the word nuṭq (or, 
here, its derived form nāṭiq, the active participle) is intended by al-Fārābī. As noted above,132 the 
basic meaning of nuṭq is “(articulated) speech”, hence the basic meaning of nāṭiq is “speaker” or 
“one who employs articulated speech”.133 It seems obvious that animals cannot employ articulated 
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speech, so one wonders why al-Fārābī might use such a description. The conclusion which might 
then be drawn is that the meaning of the root can be changed by the writer to suit his purposes. 
Thus we could render nāṭiq in chapter 8, section 4 as “rational”.134 Conversely, by comparison with 
other passages in al-Madīna al-fāḍila,135 we can find support for the idea that al-Fārābī uses nuṭq 
and its derived forms as terms with consistent meanings. This challenges the idea that al-ḥayawān 
ghayr an-nāṭiq is to be understood within the Aristotelian context of man as a rational animal. 
If the reader were to accept reading nāṭiq as “rational”, “possessing logic”, numerous difficult 
questions are raised about the nature of animals as discussed elsewhere in al-Madīna al-fāḍila, for 
example the beginning of chapter 10 on the faculties of the soul:136 
اذاف ثدح ناسنلإا لوأف ام ثديح هيف ةوقلا تيلا ابِّ ىّذغتي يهو ةوقلا ةيذاغلا .ثم نم دعب كلذ ةوقلا تيلا ابِّ  ّسِيح سومللما لثم ةرارلْا 
ةدوبرلاو ،اهرئاسو تيلاو بِّا  ّسيح ،موعطلا تيلاو ابِّ  ّسيح ،حئاورلا تيلاو ابِّ  ّسيح ،تاوصلأا تيلاو ابِّ  ّسيح ناوللأا تارصبلماو  اهلك لثم 
تاعاعشلا ثديحو عم  ّساولْا ةوق ىرخأ ابِّ عوزن لىإ ام هّسيح هقاتشيف وأ ههركي.  
Once a person exists, the first thing to arise in him is the faculty by which he takes nourishment, 
namely the nutritive faculty. Then there arises the faculty by which he senses the tangible, such 
as heat, cold and other tangibles, and the faculty by which he senses tastes, that by which he 
senses smells, that by which he senses sounds, and that by which he senses colours and all seen 
things such as rays of light. With the senses another faculty arises, the appetition137 for him to 
yearn for or hate what he perceives. 
This initial discussion of faculties is significant for us because it demonstrates some further 
necessary commonalities between humans and animals. Animals must also have the nutritive 
faculty, because otherwise they would starve. The intriguing question here is how animals can be 
said to yearn for or hate things, or indeed to perceive taste, smell or sound in the way that the 
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word might commonly be understood.138 It also might occur to the reader that, since plants also 
necessarily take nourishment in order to survive, they also have the nutritive faculty. Surely a 
creature which is not rational perceives taste and so on in a different way from humans, who are 
rational. Thus we can call into question the idea that nāṭiq is used to mean “rational”. 
This passage begs more questions than it answers if we accept nāṭiq to be understood as “rational”, 
because the reader might wonder how to reconcile animals not being rational with the fact that 
they must also have the nutritive faculty. One also wonders what causes yearning or hatred, that is 
to say how a person – or an animal – decides what is yearned for and what is hated. A possible 
answer would be that this is fiṭra, primordial human nature.139 
Reproduction, said to be subordinate to the nutritive faculty, is also a function in common between 
humans and animals. We read in chapter 12 on the organs of reproduction:140 
ةوقلاو تيلا ابِّ نوكي ديلوتلا اهنم ةسيئر اهنمو ةمداخ .ةسيئرلاو اهنم في ،بلقلا ةمدالخاو في ءاضعأ ديلوتلا ةوقلاو تيلا ابِّ نوكي ديلوتلا 
،ناتنثا اهمادحإ  ُت ّدِع ةّدالما تيلا ابِّ نوكي ناويلْا يذلا هل كلت ،ةوقلا ىرخلأاو يطعت ةروص كلذ عونلا نم ناويلْا كرتحو ةّدالما لىإ نأ لصتح 
اله كلت ةروصلا.  
The faculty by which generation occurs is partly ruling and partly serving. The ruling part is in 
the heart, and the serving part in the organs of generation. The faculty by which generation 
occurs is twofold: one prepares the matter by which animals which have that faculty exist, and 
the other gives the form of that type of animal and moves the matter that it might attain that 
form. 
Here al-Fārābī tells us that at least some animals have the faculty by which generation occurs. 
While the writer does concern himself in chapter 12 mainly with human beings and how they 
reproduce, it follows from this passage that animals and humans have in common subordinate 
                                                          
138
 Cf. Lane, Wehr ḥassa I “to feel”, “to sense”, etc. whereas IV “to perceive”, “to notice”, “to hear” etc. 
139
 See below pp50ff. for the question of fiṭra in al-Madīna al-fāḍila. 
140
 IV, 12, §1 (p186) 
45 
 
aspects of at least one of the faculties of the soul, in this case the nutritive faculty, as well as the 
faculty itself. 
Walzer claims that this passage and chapter 12 generally are based on Aristotle’s On the Generation 
of Animals.141 The problem with this is that he presupposes the existence of a comprehensive 
edition of all the psychological and biological writings of Aristotle, and that such an edition – if it 
existed – was available to and used by al-Fārābī. This is not impossible, but it is more likely that al-
Fārābī sourced his ideas here about twofold generation from his own perceptions and studies, or 
indeed from the Qurʾān:142 
نِمَو  هلُك   ءْيَش اَنْقَلَخ  ِْيَجْوَز  ْمُك لَعَل  َنوُر َكذَت  
And of all things We created two of a pair, that you might remember. 
The idea that generation is twofold can be seen to stem in part from the Qurʾān. Whether al-Fārābī 
had this particular verse in mind when writing al-Madīna al-fāḍila cannot be known for certain, but 
the idea that he used verses from the Qurʾān in forming his philosophy would seem to be a more 
reasonable assumption than that he used a compilation of Aristotle which is not known to have 
existed, been translated or been accessible to al-Fārābī. Even if it did, we know that the idea of 
twofold generation does not occur anywhere in On the Generation of Animals.143 For these reasons, 
it is more likely that al-Fārābī either came up with the idea of the faculty of generation by twofold 
by himself or from another source, or understood this Qurʾānic verse as referring specifically to the 
generation of animals and humans.  
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Al-Fārābī compares the violence of animals with that of flawed human beings in chapter 18, on the 
views of pagan and erring states. He describes the views of these flawed states as making a 
comparison with nature in order to justify their actions:144 
اذإف ىرن ايرثك نم ناويلْا بثي ىلع يرثك نم اهيقاب سمتليف اهداسفإ الهاطبإو نم يرغ نأ عفتني  ءيشب نم كلذ اعفن ،رهظي ّهنأك دق  َعُِبط 
ىلع نأ لا نوكي  ُدوجولما في لماعلا هرسأب ،َهيرغ وأ نأ دوجو لك ام هاوس  ّراض هل عىل نأ لَعَيَ دوجو هيرغ ّاراض هل نإو لم نكي هنم ءيش 
رخآ يرغ هنأ دوجوم طقف .ثم لك دحاو اهنم نإ لم مري كلذ سمتلا نأ دبعتسي َهيرغ اميف ،هعفني لِعُجو لك عون نم لك عون هذبِّ ،لالْا 
فيو يرثك اهنم لِعُج لك صخش نم لك صخش نم هعون هذبِّ لالْا.  
We see many animals attacking other animals. They seek to ruin and destroy them without 
gaining any apparent benefit from it, as if it were designed by nature that nothing else should 
exist in the world except this animal, or that the existence of other animals should be seen as 
harmful, its very existence being arranged with this purpose in view, although there is actually 
no harm in the other animal except its existence alone. Then even if the other animals do not 
have this intention, it tries regardless to enslave others insofar as it might use them. This is the 
way in which the relation between the different species is arranged, and in many cases the 
relation of different individuals of one and the same species is arranged in the same way. 
This important passage sees al-Fārābī criticise the citizens of flawed states by comparing them with 
animals.145 That such things which are so remarkably similar to human nature occur in the animal 
kingdom does not mean that humans ought to embrace their base desires to conquer and do 
violence. To do so would be to abandon the true human quest for perfection, which is happiness 
according to al-Fārābī. The souls of the inhabitants of the flawed states do not have the rational 
faculty, or the rational faculty is not effectively used, and so they are destroyed after death. In a 
sense, flawed humans regress to the point of animals by refusing to accept rationalism.146 
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Aristotle on Animals and al-Fārābī’s Alterations 
One of the more important general differences between Aristotle and al-Fārābī on animals is that 
the former never used comparisons between human and animal behaviour in order to make points 
about the afterlife and politics. Al-Fārābī used this kind of analogy in order to demonstrate the 
serious errors of flawed states, whereas the political context of Aristotle’s era may have made this 
more difficult, or indeed Aristotle may not have wished to equate even flawed humans, who still 
have moral culpability, with animals. An intertextual study of Aristotle and al-Fārābī demonstrates 
that the former’s influence on the latter is overstated, and indeed that in many key areas of al-
Madīna al-fāḍila there is no sense that al-Fārābī gave any particular attention to Aristotle. 
The definition of man as a “rational animal”, although often attributed to Aristotle by his 
commentators and modern scholars, does not occur anywhere in the surviving texts of Aristotle. 
The usual location given for the phrase is Metaphysics 7.1037b, but this passage deals with defining 
man as a “two-footed animal” rather than a “rational animal”.147 The closest Aristotle came to this 
phrase was in Nicomachean Ethics 1102a when he talks about rational and irrational parts of the 
soul: 
Now on the subject of psychology some of the teaching current in extraneous discourses is 
satisfactory, and may be adopted here: namely that the soul consists of two parts, one irrational 
and the other capable of reason.148 Whether these two parts are really distinct in the sense that 
the parts of the body or of any other divisible whole are distinct, or whether though 
distinguishable in thought as two they are inseparable in reality, like the convex and concave 
sides of a curve, is a question of no importance for the matter in hand. Of the irrational part of 
the soul again one division appears to be common to all living things, and of a vegetative nature: 
I refer to the part that causes nutrition and growth […] 149 
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We understand that al-Fārābī may have used this passage when formulating his own ideas on the 
faculties of the soul, as Aristotle also says that it is part of the soul, common to all living things, 
which causes nutrition. Worth noting, however, is that al-Fārābī called the faculties of the soul five 
in number: he did not simply split the social into rational and irrational parts. 
Even so, the initial description of the faculties of the soul in al-Madīna al-fāḍila still seems similar to 
conventional Peripatetic philosophy,150 at least with regard to the inference that the nutritive 
faculty belonging to all living creatures. It is the particular terms which al-Fārābī used within this 
description, however, which cast doubt upon the idea that he simply copied Aristotle and his 
commentators. This is because words like nuṭq and its derived forms do not necessarily conform to 
Greek logos, which is difficult to pin down to a specific translation. If al-Fārābī really did intend that 
al-ḥayawān an-nāṭiq be understood as “the rational animal”, one wonders why he did not select a 
word such as ʿaqlāni, manṭiqī, ʿāqil or simply ʿaqlī instead of nāṭiq. We also need to remember that 
Aristotle himself never defined man as a “rational animal” in his books: the first to use this phrase, 
although in a slightly different form, was Porphyry who called man a “mortal rational animal”.151 
Al-Fārābī may not have wished that al-ḥayawān an-nāṭiq be understood as “the rational animal” 
because of a deliberate decision on his part. Based on the consistent use of nāṭiq and other forms 
based on this root in al-Madīna al-fāḍila, we can suggest that the writer intended us to understand 
consistently such derived forms according to their common meaning of speech. Al-Fārābī used 
speech in al-Madīna al-fāḍila to differentiate between animals and man, and rational thought to 
differentiate between correct and incorrect human behaviour.152 
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Brief mention can be made of Aristotle’s attitude towards slavery and his defence of it. Aristotle 
considered slaves to be a separate category from both animals and humans, as he stated in his 
Nicomachean Ethics:153 
[…] friendship does not exist towards things without souls, nor is it an even [i.e. proportionate] 
thing. Nor does it exist towards a horse or an ox, towards a slave or as a slave, for it has nothing 
in common with these things. A slave is a tool with a soul, just as a tool is a slave without a 
soul.154 
Al-Fārābī would have disagreed. He does not say anywhere in al-Madīna al-fāḍila that slaves are 
reduced to subhuman status because of their being slaves, nor does he compare slaves with 
animals. He actually criticises the practice by attacking the citizens of flawed states which compare 
their actions to those of animals in order to justify violence against others and enslavement of 
other people.155 It is instructive to compare Bogomolov’s analysis of the social context of ancient 
philosophy,156 which may help us to understand the origin of Aristotle’s ideas on slavery more fully. 
That said, al-Fārābī lived in a society which had also been marked by its active use of slave 
labour.157 The Zanj rebellion was finally crushed after a long campaign only ten years after al-
Fārābī’s birth, so it is difficult to believe that he was not aware of the debate about slaves and their 
status in society when he was in Baghdad – and yet there is no sense in al-Madīna al-fāḍila that 
slaves are subhuman, nor is there any attempt at justifying of the practice of keeping slaves. 
Differing opinions on slavery between Aristotle and al-Fārābī cannot be reduced purely to the 
differing societal contexts of their work. 
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 1161b 
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 […] φιλία δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς 
δοῦλον ᾗ δοῦλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν: ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ᾽ ὄργανον 
ἄψυχος δοῦλος. 
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 See above p46 
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 pp12-13. Despite Bogomolov’s Communist beliefs and desire to emphasise what he saw as a class struggle 
between slave-owners and slaves in ancient Athens, his evaluation of the impact of Aristotle’s social and 
political environment on the philosopher’s works remains valid. 
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Fiṭra in the Text and Comparison with the Qurʾān 
There are many possible ways of translating the Qurʾānic term fiṭra, from the simple including 
“creation”, “nature”, “disposition” and so on,158 to the more complex such as “a kind or way of 
creating or of being created”.159 “Primordial human nature” is generally a good fit for al-Madīna al-
fāḍila because it is usually applied to human beings. The first mention of this term occurs towards 
the start of al-Fārābī’s description of the ideal ruler:160 
 ]...[لا نكيم نأ نوكي ناسنلإا لاني لامكلا يذلا هلجلأ تلعُج هل ةرطفلا ةيعيبطلا لاإ تاعامتجاب ةعاجم ةيرثك ينواعتم موقي لك دحاو لكل دحاو 
ضعبب ام جاتيح هيلإ ]...[  
[…] a person cannot attain the perfection for whose sake his natural disposition was made for 
him unless many co-operating societies come together and each supply the other with what they 
need […] 
In this case we can see that the word fiṭra is applied specifically to human beings. What is 
significant, though, is that the person’s natural disposition is said to have been made for him: he 
does not make it for himself. The reader would likely infer that it is God who made fiṭra for the 
person, because God is the First Cause who, ultimately, made everything. Aristotle did not use such 
a term as fiṭra in On the Soul or in any of his other works, necessarily because, for him, there was 
no personal God who might design people’s dispositions. Walzer argues161 that fiṭra was selected 
here because it contrasts with other words which make divine providence clearer – we can call this 
statement into question because of the Qurʾānic origin of the term, and the way in which al-Fārābī 
uses it. 
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 Lane, Wehr 
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 EI “fiṭra” 
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 V, 15, §1 (p229) 
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 1998 p429 
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Part of the originality of al-Fārābī’s writing is manifest in his inclination to modify the scope of 
usage of the word fiṭra. When discussing the perfect state, the writer compares its organs with 
those of humans who rule and serve:162 
كلذك ةنيدلما اهؤازجأ ةفلتمخ رطفلا ةلضافتم تائيلها ]...[  
Thus the state: its parts are of different natures, and their natural dispositions are unequal in 
excellence [...]  
It is important that fiṭra is also applied to the institutions of the state, because this helps us 
understand who created the pefect state: God. God gives fiṭra to people and things, and it is a 
recurring idea in al-Madīna al-fāḍila that faith in God and knowledge of revelation are required for 
the perfect state to be so. Al-Fārābī is different from Aristotle in this area because the latter did not 
claim divine creation and design of the functions of the state. 
Let us now turn to the Qurʾān and consider some important verses which include the word fiṭra and 
derived forms from this root. Perhaps the most significant is its occurrence as an active verb, 
faṭara:163 
 هنيِإ  ُتْه جَو  َيِهْجَو يِذ ِلل  َرَطَف ٱ  َم سل  َو ِت  َوٱ َضْرَلأ   افيِنَح آَمَو  َْاَنأ  َنِم ٱ َيِِكرْشُمْل  
Truly I have set my face towards Him who created the Heavens and the Earth, and I am not 
among those who associate partners with God. 
Thus we can understand that there is a clear Qurʾānic precedent for the word fiṭra being used of 
God’s actions in creating things.164 Al-Fārābī took this term from the Qurʾān and used it as part of 
his philosophy in order to make his points clearer, which means that such points can be contrasted 
with Aristotle, who did not write about a concept related to fiṭra. 
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 V, 15, §4 (p232) 
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 Al-Anʿām (6): 79 
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 Cf. Griffel pp9-11 
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One other prominent example of faṭara can be cited, this time occurring in the context of exhorting 
humans to attempt to follow the fiṭra by which God created them:165 
 ْمَِقَأف  َكَهْجَو  ِني هدِلل   افيِنَح  َتَرْطِف ٱ ِه لل ٱ ِتي ل  َرَطَف ٱ َسا نل اَهْ يَلَع  َلا  َليِدْب َت  ِقَْلِلخ ٱ ِه لل  َكِلَذ ٱ ُني هدل ٱ ُمهيَقْل   َلَو  نِك  َر َثْكَأ ٱ ِسا نل  َلا  َنوُمَلْع َي  
So set your face to the religion, a man of pure faith - the disposition by which God created 
people. Let there be no change to the creation of God. That is the straight religion, but most 
people know not. 
The idea of many humans not understanding the truth is also common in al-Madīna al-fāḍila, which 
might lead one to suggest that al-Fārābī found it in the Qurʾān and used it in his philosophy because 
of its presence in the Book. The significance of this passage is that it refers to the disposition by 
which God created people. It seems possible that al-Fārābī named one of the functions of this 
disposition as perfection and that he had this verse in mind when writing about how mankind was 
made with the inclination to seek perfection in al-Madīna al-fāḍila.166 
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 Ar-Rūm (30): 30 
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 IV, 13, §5, quoted and analysed above pp34-35 
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Conclusion 
Based on the evidence in al-Madīna al-fāḍila, it is difficult to reduce al-Fārābī to a pure Aristotelian 
who was devoid of religious influence or original ideas. While his philosophy is not completely new, 
it is in its detail that we find his originality and tendency to view the truth, as he saw it, as being 
more important in itself than who said it. Challenging the notion that Aristotle’s legacy dominated 
al-Fārābī’s work in one particular book could also lead us to analyse his other books afresh, 
disarmed of the preconceived notion that all he really did was copy and preserve ancient Greek 
philosophy. 
From his highly-developed description of the First Cause to his new ideas about the nature of 
animals, as well as his emphasis on the importance of faith and revelation in the perfect state, al-
Fārābī made his ideas suited to his times and practical in dealing with the political, philosophic and 
theological questions of the Islamic Golden Age. That said, there are commonalities between the 
social context of al-Fārābī and that of Aristotle – the difference between them is chiefly the 
presence of revealed religion. By understanding this point, we can also come to question other 
long-held views about al-Fārābī’s oeuvre. Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma has often been dismissed in modern times 
as either misattributed to al-Fārābī or unimportant because of its being understood in the wrong 
context. Approaching such works from the point of view of the writer’s original thought and Muslim 
beliefs may yield results as to the possible mystical beliefs of al-Fārābī, and it would certainly allow 
us to re-open the book on his place in history. 
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